Unification was aided by Canadian history, the political climate of the mid-1960's, a peculiar defense posture, and unique cultural demands.
The reorganization sought to cut costL, improve control mechanisms, and overcome duplication.
Although it has not lived up to fiscal expectations, unificrition has achieved other goals.
The effects of personnel disruption are being overcome. Similar problems exist in the United States, but different conditions and a different approach to integration prevent merger-type unificaLion from being feasible here.
The Canadian experiment, however, suggests several measures which should be examined and might safely be pursued in this country.
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, A i ~ ~ ~ J ~ I ' b ~ .. *'pb "Why, I would undertake the command of a fleet without the slightest hesitation. And, when I told them to do some- In addition, career opportunities needed broadening, as did the base for selection of senior officers. 1 2 Decisionmaking wus delayed by over two hundred tri-service committees, an amazing number for a total force of oniy 125,000.13
The emphasis, however, was on cutting costs. Speci'ically, the manpower expenses of an all-volunteer system were eating precariously into funds for modernization of equipment. with obvious economies in use of instructors and facilities. 1 6 The job was completed in 1968 with the formal institution of one service, the Canadian Armed Forces: one uniform, the "jolly green jumper"; and one rank structure with one salute. 1 7 
RESULTS OF U14IFICATION
It wgs this last step, the abolishment of the three services, that caused the most furor. At least four admirals, three air marshalls, and two generals resigned or were fired.
They complained about confusion, lost values, and reduced combat effectiveness.1 8 Were the detractors right or wrong? A precise, complete assessment of accomplishments is an impossibility, even after six years. Inflation and the ballooning prices of complicated modern equipment distort cost comparisons, as does the reduction in total manpower from 125,000 to the present 83,000.
The new posture has never been tested in combat. Although much opposition to the unification of the Canadian forces was voiced in operational or financial terms, most of the asony arisin; from unification was the result of cul ural shocK, the disturbance of the sense of community within each of the three former services. The kossibility of loss or erosion of such tbings as the ru~imental system, the traditions woven into the oruer of the fbrmer services, the more familiar faces of routines, the style cf each service, all wei-he; far anore heavily on most opponents of unification than did 9 '7 the direct operational or financial aspects.
A lessened sense of community will be found in the present Canadian forces, with a narrowing of the separation from the civilian social order, until new and shared experiences, traditions, routines, and customs develop. 3 2 Here, again, there are many variables other than unification.
Morale can be heavily influenced by such factors as outmoded equipment, reduced promotion opportunities in a shrinking force, and the general pressures and anxieties affecting all of society.
The professional competence of CAF personnel has is- 
LES.3ONS FOR ThE UNITED STATES
The United States has an immediate concern with the capacity of the reduced and reoriented CAF to be of help in the defense of North America and to fulfill Canadiaxi commitments to our mutual defense alliances. That question, like the current Canadian economic protectionism, is one over which we have no control and semingly little influence.
We cur., however, examine their experience with armed forces unification for potential lessons. The committee system continues in the United States.
It will alsays be here because such a laree and complex military establisament will always have a need for coordination.
Time-critical decisions, however, can be made through the In addition, he offers the following judgments:
... Experts in military organization often argue that 'unification' requires withe-the wbrger of the four services into a single uaiform or the abolition of the services and organization of the Pentagon purely on a functional basis. The former proposal, however, is blindly utopian in rejecting the inevitability of pluralism, and the latter could intensify conflict to the point where it would be unbearable.
'Unification' is more likely to come not from the reduction or elimination of intra-military controversy but from its multipli-
cation.
Diversification of function also gave the services organizational flexibility and balance by freeing S* tL.em from identification with and dependence upon an y4ingle strategic concept of functional-missiom.
The adversary systea is the long-acknowledged sine -qa non of Angb-American jurisprudence.
It takes two lawyers in a a courtroom for the truth to be reached. 
